The sinking of the ship, the pride of their submarine fleet, was a devastating blow to the Russian military. [9] Kursk 's participation in the exercise had been intended to demonstrate Russia's place as an important player on the international stage, but the country's inept handling of the crisis instead exposed its weak political decision-making ability and the decline of its military. [12]

Vice Admiral Mikhail Motsak, the Russian naval commander overseeing the recovery operation, said the Kursk should arrive in the harbour of the town of Roslyakovo, near Murmansk, at around 12pm Moscow time (0800 GMT) on Wednesday. All 118 crewmen lost their lives in the disaster: a devastating blow to Russian military pride and the reputation of the recently elected President Vladimir Putin, who refused to cut short his holiday to deal with the crisis. On 1 December 2001, Prosecutor General Vladimir Ustinov presented a preliminary report to Putin. Ustinov wrote that the entire exercise had been "poorly organized" and that the probe had revealed "serious violations by both Northern Fleet chiefs and the Kursk crew." [109] Shortly afterward, Putin transferred the Northern Fleet commander, Vyacheslav Popov, and his chief of staff, Admiral Mikhail Motsak. [58] As is common in such circumstances, both soon obtained jobs elsewhere in the government. Popov became a representative for the Murmansk region in the Federation Council, and Motsak became deputy presidential envoy for the North-Western Federal District. [70] Popov and Motsak had championed the story that the accident had been caused by a collision with a NATO submarine. When Putin dismissed them, he made a point of repudiating the collision theory. [6] :163 In another example of a lateral transfer, Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov had been an outspoken advocate of the theory that the Kursk had collided with a foreign submarine. He had also been in charge of the rescue operation and follow-up inquiry. In February 2002, Putin removed him from his position as Deputy prime minister and made him minister of industry, science, and technology. [109] But the report of the secret Board of Inquiry into the Sidon disaster revealed some staggering new pieces of information. If the seas get rough, the barge may take a longer journey, allowing it to wait out a storm near the coast. Reports threatened worse weather for this evening, with snow flurries covering Murmansk.Putin dismissed the Northern Fleet's submarine commander, Vice-Admiral Oleg Burtsev, [6] :162 and in total removed 12 high-ranking officers in charge of the Northern Fleet. Paradoxically, he said their dismissal had nothing to do with the Kursk disaster, [13] [70] but that they had been responsible for "serious flaws in the organizations of the service." However, all 12 had been involved with the exercise, the rescue operations, or the submarine itself. [20] :34 All were transferred to equal positions elsewhere in the government or in the business sector. [73] International co-operation [ edit ] It's 13:15. All personnel from section six, seven, and eight have moved to section nine, 23 people are here. We feel bad, weakened by carbon dioxide... Pressure is increasing in the compartment. If we head for the surface we won't survive the compression. We won't last more than a day.... All personnel from sections six, seven, and eight have moved to section nine. We have made the decision because none of us can escape. [28] [34] [100] Submarine Kursk was a nuclear submarine, and from the dwindling Russian military point-of-view, its relevance to asserting Russia’s dominance in terms of nuclear power was enormous. However, what was supposed to be a routine Russian naval exercise turned out to be the worst nightmare for the highly sophisticated Russian submarine members, categorised under the K-141 cadre, which exploded and perished in the deep blue sea, killing everyone on board. That is far beyond the reach of British or US rescue submersibles; in fact, only a handful of unmanned Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROVs) can operate at that depth. Sviatov, George. "The Kursk's Loss Offers Lessons." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 129.6 (2003): 71. Academic Search Premier. Web. 7 December 2011.

On 29 or 30 August 2000, an official government commission tasked with investigating the disaster announced that the likely cause of the sinking was a "strong 'dynamic external impact' corresponding with the 'first event'", probably a collision with a foreign submarine or a large surface ship, or striking a World War II mine. [7] They said that the exercise had been monitored by two American Los Angeles-class submarines— USS Memphis and Toledo—and the Royal Navy Swiftsure-class submarine HMS Splendid. Russian sources said that when the exercise was cancelled due to the accident, these vessels put in at European ports. [48] Size and mass comparison of Kursk and USS Toledo, which is less than half of Kursk 's displacement In any event, the Russian rescue teams were poorly equipped and badly organised, while foreign teams and equipment were far away and not given permission to assist. [6] :143–145 [65] It is unlikely that any rescue by either Russian or foreign specialists could have arrived and reached the sub in time to rescue any survivors. [104] Forensic examination [ edit ]During the original exercise, the Russians required each of their submarines to stay within a specified area. This protocol was intended to eliminate the possibility of a collision and to allow surface ships to detect the presence of a Western spy sub.

In addition, Kuznetsov says, a sonar operator aboard the battle cruiser Pyotr Veliky identified and reported an explosion at 11:28 a.m. on August 12. He located the explosion at the exact position where the Kursk was known to be. K-141 Kursk ( Russian: Атомная Подводная Лодка «Курск» (АПЛ «Курск»), transl. Atomnaya Podvodnaya Lodka "Kursk" (APL "Kursk"), meaning "Atomic-powered submarine Kursk") was an Oscar II-class nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine of the Russian Navy. On 12 August 2000, K-141 Kursk was lost when it sank in the Barents Sea, killing all 118 personnel on board. I had taught students about the Sidon accident for years in a class about torpedos and we always believed it had something to do with the hydrogen peroxide,' Stradling told The Observer, 'but no one really knew how it had happened.' a b Underwood, Lamar, ed. (2005). The Greatest Submarine Stories Ever Told: Dive! Dive! Fourteen Unforgettable Stories from the Deep. Guilford, Connecticut: Lyons Press. ISBN 978-1592287338. The Russian government convened a commission, chaired by Vice-Premier Ilya Klebanov, on 14 August, two days after Kursk sank. [11] Nearly half of the commission members were officials with a stake in the outcome of the investigation. Independent investigators were not invited to take part, giving the appearance that the commission's findings might not be impartial. [20] :32 Weather delays efforts [ edit ]

Robert Moore's book, A Time to Die: The Kursk Disaster , was an acclaimed account of the failed attempt to rescue the sailors trapped aboard the Russian nuclear-powered submarine. Maintenance records revealed that the 65-76 "Kit" practice torpedo carried by Kursk came from a batch of 10 manufactured in 1990, six of which were rejected due to faulty welding. An investigation revealed that because the torpedoes were not intended to carry warheads, the welds had not been inspected as carefully as welds on torpedoes carrying warheads. When salvage crews finally recovered the remains of the torpedo and the launch tube, analysis determined that both bore signs of distortion and heat damage that were consistent with an explosion near the middle of the torpedo, very close to an essential welded joint. The official conclusion of the commission was that a faulty weld had led to the explosion. [71] Escape capsule inaccessible [ edit ] The Kursk was declared to be in trouble only at 23:30," Kuznetsov says. "That is, 12 hours had passed. Those 12 hours were lost time."