The book focuses on Russian and Ukrainian developments following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. It highlights Russian persistance in weakening Ukraine whilst recognising it as the most important element of any imperial revival, be it the Tsarist Empire or Soviet Empires (whose flags have been raised in St Petersberg last month), or as a commonwealth, as envisioned by Yeltsin.

In his 2021 Kremlin paper Putin claimed that the notion of Ukrainian independence was the result of a great geopolitical error by Vladimir Lenin when the USSR was created in 1922: Lenin insisted that the document creating the Soviet Union recognize the right of any SSR to secede from the USSR. That assurance – an inducement for individual states to agreed to become SSRs – was a "time bomb" in the creation of the USSR. That bomb went off when the USSR disbanded in 1991 and modern Ukraine – the successor to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic that initially joined the USSR – took the exit door following after a general referendum that included Crimea: Only a minority of Ukrainians were "Russian" but 82 percent voted to secede; a majority of Crimeans were Russian, but still 54 percent voted for secession. Had Lenin's "time bomb" in the USSR constitution been respected, modern Ukraine's independence would have been settled. Instead,Putin chose to treat the right to secede as an error requiring correction. Plokhy’s betoog begint bij het uiteenvallen van de Sovjet-Unie. Meer dan welke andere gebeurtenis ook, bezegelde de onafhankelijkheidsverklaring van de Oekraïense Sovjetrepubliek in 1991 het lot van de Sovjet-Unie. Een ruime meerderheid van de kiezers, ook in de Russischtalige gebieden in de Donbas-regio en op het Krim-schiereiland, stemde destijds in een referendum voor de onafhankelijkheid van Oekraïne. De president van Rusland, Boris Jeltsin, besloot zich hierbij neer te leggen, waarna Rusland, dat zich onder leiding van Jeltsin op vergelijkbare wijze losmaakte van de Sovjet-Unie, de Oekraïense onafhankelijkheid erkende. Desondanks is de onafhankelijkheid van Oekraïne in Moskou altijd omstreden gebleven. Russische elites bleven aanspraak maken op de geopolitieke nalatenschap van de Sovjet-Unie en daarmee op Oekraïne als onderdeel van de Russische invloedssfeer. Poetin staat daarin dus bepaald niet alleen. Amid the macro-level analysis, "The Russo-Ukrainian War" also reminds us of the conflict’s devastating human toll. Interviewing Ukrainian refugees, Plokhy writes of how they “fled the Russian invasion, abandoning all their possessions and trying to save their lives. They were driven out by the fear of death, not by the hardships of war, and often risked their lives in the process.” While many readers may generally be tempted to skip a book’s Afterword, Plokhy’s merits attention because it underscores the human tragedy through his painful account of the deaths, first of one of his readers, Lieutenant Yevhen Olerenko, and then of his cousin, Andriy Khlopov. Recounting how he struggled to find the right words to respond to their tragic deaths, he writes poignantly: “I did not find any, there were none.” While it is not entirely clear from Plokhy’s account why this war broke out when it did, his narrative demolishes the popular notion that somehow NATO was to blame. At least, not in the way this thesis is usually understood.Historians, used to slow-burning research projects, have so far been absent from this developing historiography of the war. This is beginning to change, and it is only appropriate that the lead is taken by one of the most accomplished English-language historians of Ukraine, Harvard University’s Serhii Plokhy. I wonder whether he can foresee the disintegration of the Russian Federation as it is currently constituted – especially in a context where Russia is seemingly recruiting its military disproportionately from its Muslim peoples and peripheral autonomous republics. “The process of disintegration has already started,” he replies. “Already Russia doesn’t control its constitutional territory” – by which he means that some parts of Ukraine that were formally adopted as part of the Russian Federation last autumn in the wake of the full-scale invasion, such as Kherson, have already been liberated and restored to Ukrainian hands. But yes, he says, republics on the edges of the federation – such as Tuva, Buryatia and Sakha, not to mention Chechnya, are vulnerable. “The longer the war goes on, the stronger the narrative that Russia is using them as cannon fodder.” Plokhy prefers “Russo-Ukrainian war” to alternatives like “ Russia’s war against Ukraine”. While the latter expression is well suited to emphasising Russia’s culpability in this war, the former stresses that Ukraine is not just a victim of Russia, but its equal. I'm glad I read Serhii Plokhy's 'The Russo - Ukrainian War : The Return of History'. It is insightful and detailed and makes us think a lot. His chapter contrasting Ukraine and Russia’s different trajectories is fascinating. After a semi-democratic interlude under Boris Yeltsin, Moscow reverted to autocracy. Ukraine, by contrast, managed to preserve a competitive presidential-parliamentary system. Regional differences helped. Pro-reform nationalists in the west of the country had to find compromises with Moscow-leaning communists in the east. His chapter contrasting Ukraine and Russia’s different trajectories is fascinating

In short, Plohky claims that Putin's success on today's battlefield would not restore Russia to its former self; rather, it would create a new entity – a Ukraine once again subservient to the Federation of Russia. Der Verfasser erzählt und erklärt mit Herzblut. Er macht deutlich, dass sich die Welt verändert hat und Moskau sich nicht mehr alles erlauben kann. Er sagt aber auch, dass es ein Fehler der freien Welt war, auf die Annexion der Krim bloß mit lauwarmen Worten zu reagieren, nur um Russland nicht zu erzürnen, denn, „mit der Annexion der Krim wurden Imperialismus und Nationalismus zu zentralen Elementen und Triebkräften der russischen Außenpolitik“. Ebenso war es ein krasser Fehler, der Ukraine auf dem Bukarest-Gipfel 2008 den Weg in die Nato zu verweigern, denn dadurch war die Ukraine, die zuvor auf ihr Atomwaffenarsenal verzichtet hatte, schutzlos. Doch die Souveränität der Ukraine ist wichtig für Europa und für den Frieden in der ganzen Welt. Plokhy stellt natürlich auch dar, wie sich China positioniert, wie die USA, wie Indien, der ferne Osten, die europäischen Länder - und erklärt auch warum. It was very interesting to read how Crimea was "transferred" to Ukraine for economic reasons, and Putin's supposed reasoning for raiding Ukraine. It is vital that the West keeps up support for Ukraine. Russia must, in no way, be allowed to claim any sort of victory at any time and for any reason.I felt the author did not pay enough attention to the intellectual, emotional effect Alexander Dugin has on Putin. Putin's program according to the author is the continuation of Russia's imperial past from that of the tsars through the communist regime of the U.S.S.R. This is true in general because Russia has not had its moment of being a mighty imperial power like Great Britain, France and the U.S. It is also true that Dugin is supplying the intellectual and emotional frame work for Putin's vision of imperial power.