Time was of the essence, and scientists and engineers – backed by governments – rose to the challenge. Still, by 1914 fleets of gun-armed capital ships dominated naval thinking, much as the ship of the line had more than a century before. In 1942, however, Japan seized both of these regions, effectively cutting off the US supply of natural rubber.

Militaries generally regard the goal of technological innovation as a matter of progressive improvement in a proven field: larger guns firing bigger shells to greater ranges, for example. Within each of these chapters, they do a commendable job of producing a pleasingly readable condensed history that compares development success and failure across several nations including the United States, United Kingdom, Russia (and the USSR), Italy, France, Germany, Japan, and the Ottoman Empire, although not all of them in each case. For mines, torpedoes, and radio, this is the Russo-Japanese War; for submarines and aircraft, World War I; and for radar, World War II. So too was the tactical goal of the commanding admirals: to concentrate their firepower through maneuver while preventing their opponents from doing the same. Technology is constantly evolving, and the navies of the twenty-first century are juggling innovations that are likely to revolutionize naval warfare as profoundly as did the introduction of steam and steel in the nineteenth century or electronics in the twentieth.

A secret memorandum from a British destroyer captain to his superior officer dated 26 December 1942 noted that he had at his disposal Type 285, 286, and 271 radars, sonar, a radio interception device, very high frequency radio, shore radar plots, enemy reports from remote sources, an automatic plotting device, and several binocular-enhanced sets of eyes. In essence, technology is the practical application of knowledge expressed through the use of a device. Much of the information derived from these tools required instantaneous action, not to mention the fact that he had many other things to think of and duties to perform in action, particularly under conditions of modern night action. Differences in national resources, force mixtures, priorities, perceptions, and missions forced nations to approach the problems presented by new technologies in different ways. What matters is the process by which each technology’s possibilities were first recognized, tested, and then used, or not used, to best advantage.

Naval professionals throughout the long decades of peace leading up to 1914 expended great effort trying to keep pace with the tactical implications of rapidly changing capital ship technology.Phenomenal advances were made in aeronautics, computing, chemical engineering, medicine and food science.

Highly recommended for anyone wanting to better understand the implementation of historic naval innovations. These platforms allowed navies to operate in new environments below and above the surface of the sea, confounding existing weapons and tactics and expanding the scope of naval warfare. Ship propulsion evolved from sail to steam, and fuel from coal to fuel oil to nuclear; guns progressed from muzzle-loaders to automated 8-inch cannons; mechanical fire control was invented and elaborated. Navies will still require wings, but those wings may well prove to be of a new type (such as unmanned drones) flying from new platforms rather than large, expensive aircraft flying from large, expensive ships.But a decisive weapon must have not only a target, but also a hand to wield it properly—the practice and technique to properly bend the bow. This change began in the mid-19th century with the advent of coal-fired steam engines, armor, and mines.

Line-abreast formations were tried and discarded; ramming tactics went in and out of fashion; torpedoes and speed were heralded (by some) as revolutionary. New technologies can also be dead ends, and there are many examples of navies clinging to an inferior technology or not getting a new technology until too late. It also provides some stimulus for consideration by those planning the future of navies, in an inceasingly complex and challenging world. Admiral Jellicoe, however, also worried about floating mines dropped by retreating enemy ships, moored mines prepositioned for ambush, and torpedoes fired by surface ships or submarines. For five of the technologies, the exploitation phase occurred in World War II; radio was sufficiently developed by 1914 to be exploited in both wars.

Heinz worked for many years as a financial services lawyer while maintaining an active interest in military and naval history. Remembrance Day gives us an opportunity to reflect upon the two world wars and remember those who have died in conflicts. We don’t share your credit card details with third-party sellers, and we don’t sell your information to others. Whilst discussing some post World War 2 technological developments the authors generally avoid assessments arguing that the technologies have not been tested in major power conflict in more recent years, and hence accurate data is not available to sustain valid assessments.